Designing an emissions trading scheme requires in-depth knowledge regarding several aspects. This paper attempts to clarify some important design points of the forthcoming emissions trading scheme for aviation under the EU ETS. Five general key points of system design are acknowledged and comparisons are made to previous and current emission trading schemes. Above all, it is argued that initial allocations of emission permits and the trade barrier between the aviation sector and EU ETS need to be carefully examined.
Introduction
In a constantly expanding global economy, aviation has a key role. There are no other methods of transportation that have the possibility to deliver passengers and goods across regions at the same speed and efficiency. According to Air Transport Action Group, ATAG, (2008) aviation contributes with 1.1 trillion US dollars to the global economy, corresponding to 2.3% of the world total GDP. The air transport sector also generates, directly and indirectly, 32 millions job opportunities globally. However, a large uncontrolled growth rate in the aviation sector also implies a growing impact on the environment.
In accordance to the goals set up by the Kyoto Protocol, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from the members of the European Union decreased by roughly 5% between 1990 and 2003.
Emissions from the international aviation sector are however not restricted under the Kyoto Protocol. During the same time period the total contribution of CO 2 emissions from aviation increased by an astonishing 73% (Wit et al, 2005) . According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control (IPCC, 2007) the aviation sector was responsible for 2% of global CO 2 emissions in 2007.
Passenger quantities in the aviation sector grew at a rate of roughly 5% per year during the period 2000 to 2007 according to Lee et al. (2009) . Depending on improvements in fuel efficiency and flight frequencies, this might potentially lead to an increase in emissions of greenhouse gases in the range of 3-4% annually given that no effort is put into limiting and reducing the global environmental impact from the sector (IPCC, 2007) . Thus, it is crucial to implement some control on emissions coming from the air transport sector. Based on the notion, given by Coase (1960) , that ownership regards user rights rather than a physical actual emissions, thus generating very high market prices. Using baselines of historical emissions can also create competitive advantages for firms with relatively high historical emissions while generating high cost to, for example, low price carriers who have shown a large growth during the past decennium (Frontier Economics 1 , 2006; Morell, 2007) . It is also possible that grandfathering based on historical emissions lead to perverse incentives for firms to emit more today as they expect to receive more permits in the future by doing so (Hepburn et al, 2006 ).
• Benchmarking is another method of free allocation. It is also, like Grandfathering, based on some baseline of historical emissions, however, it adds a sector specific measure.
Morell (2007) argues that one such measure could be passenger revenue tonne kilometers per tonne CO 2 for the aviation sector. If this measure is used, aircraft operators with high efficiency levels, i. e. those ones operating at high capacity without unused space on board the aircraft, will benefit. By using benchmarking, short haul flights would be penalized (due to generally higher emissions per passenger) possibly leading to higher demand for other types of transportation. Morell (2007) acknowledges that this might lead to an unfair allocation for air lines carrying a high number of premium passengers contra air lines with higher capacity.
Morell (2007) further argues that a better measure for the aviation sector would be one that considers emissions from both the landing and take-off cycle as well as the whole flight. In this way, air lines with lower capacity would not be penalized.
• Auctioning allowances has great support in the scientific literature. Hepburn et al (2006) promote auctioning particularly for the EU ETS stating that it would lead to less competitive advantages for some firms and that it would increase the over all efficiency of the scheme. Auctioning would also eliminate the perverse incentives such as delaying fleet renewal to keep emissions at a high level for future calculations of historical levels. There is a strong presence of asymmetric information when calculating base-line emission levels, aviation operators are more likely to accurately estimate their historical levels of emissions than their counterpart. One question that arises with auctioning is how to use the revenue that the auction generates (Andersen, 2001; Morell, 2007) . In Morell's (2007) opinion the revenues from an auction should go to CO 2 reducing activities, they could however be used in any way deemed suitable by the controllers.
Currently, all participants eligible to receiving emission permits will have to apply for them, a large part will be issued free of charge by grandfathering based on average historical emission levels between 2004 and 2006 while 15% will be available for auctioning. The general idea with the EU ETS is to increase the number of permits put up for auctioning in each period.
The revenues from auctioning can be used quite freely by each member state but it is suggested they should be used in emissions reducing activities such as research for more fuel efficient engines. For the first year of trading, i.e. 1 st of January to 31 st of December 2012, the total amount of allocated emission permits will sum up to 97% of the historical emissions to decrease to 95% in the following trading period, phase III of the EU ETS.
Liability
Another interesting question regarding emissions trading for the aviation sector is who will be held liable for emissions and surrendering permits? As of now, the proposal of implementing aviation into the EU ETS states that aircraft operators should be held liable for surrendering permits corresponding to their emissions, this is considered a downstream approach where the source of emissions is held liable. Bohm (1999) argues that such a downstream approach might lead to some potential problems such as (i) high transaction costs and (ii) exclusion of smaller actors for the trading scheme. If we consider these two criterions, to keep transaction costs as low as possible and to include as many emission sources as possible, the most efficient choice should be obtained. It might be more efficient to place liability on some agent prior to the emitting source, a so called upstream approach. Another important criteria is that the chosen source directly or indirectly should be able to influence fuel consumption and hence have incentives to lower them (Andersen, 2001; Frontier Economics, 2006) . This gives a number of options to consider.
• Fuel suppliers would simply include the permit price in the fuel price, making the aircraft operators inevitably bear the cost of emissions. Even though fuel suppliers do not have any influence on actual fuel consumption an increase in fuel prices would generate a reaction from the air craft operators, thus lowering emissions. Andersen (2001) argues that this option could potentially make it less costly for aircraft operators as there would be no need to enter the market for permits. Thus, by making fuel suppliers the liable source all firms, large and small, would be implemented into the system. However, in a non-intra-EU trading system it would be easy for non-EU based aircraft operators to avoid paying for emissions simply by refuelling outside of the EU (Frontier Economics, 2006 ).
• Aircraft operators have the largest direct influence over fuel efficiency and fuel consumption. Flight frequency can easily be adjusted to comply with any emission target. Air craft operators are also in direct control of fleet renewal to increase fuel efficiency. The current proposition that air craft operators should be held accountable for retiring permits limits liability to firm size and thus, does not account for all emissions 2 .
• 
Trade barriers
Implementing aviation into the already existing EU ETS can be done in several ways. One could choose to just account for aviation as any other polluter in the market, this is called an open trading scheme. However, research is divided on whether or not CO 2 and its associated emissions should be counted the same for aviation and land based emission sources (IPCC, 1999; Lee and Sausen, 2000; Wit et al, 2005) . IPPC (1999) suggests that the radiative forcing (RF
Previous Emissions Trading Schemes
As previously stated, this section will discuss, and hopefully clarify, some weaknesses and strengths of historical and current emissions trading schemes relating to the five key points discussed in the previous section.
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
In an attempt to reduce the levels of emitted greenhouse gases in accordance with the goals expressed in the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union initiated a cap-and-trade program intended to cover roughly 45 percent of total CO 2 emissions within the area, thus making the EU ETS the largest emissions trading scheme to date. Phase I of the EU ETS stretched from Each member country has their own targets for emission reductions and they are allowed to distribute permits to energy intense sectors within the country. Each member country is also responsible for calculating baselines of emissions. In phase I, 95 percent of permits were distributed free of charge with a reserve of 5 percent left for auctioning if the member countries choose to do so, the share of permits intended for auctioning will increase for each compliance period and was 10 percent in phase II. Note that these levels of auctioning refer to how much a member country is allowed to put up for auction, this is an upper ceiling rather than a fixed level. In phase I, only 4 member countries chose to put up any permits for auctioning (Betz and Sato, 2006) . Phase III of the EU ETS will start in January 2013 and end in 2020, the current goal is that emissions will be 20% lower than 1990 levels at the end of phase III.
Permit prices were highly volatile at the beginning of phase I. By 2006 when data was made available on actual verified emissions and this showed that they were lower than the distributed amount of permits, prices plummeted. According to Rogge et al. (2006) there were a number of contributing factors to the over-allocation of permits that was seen during phase I of the EU ETS. For example, the information on which baseline emissions were calculated could have been uncertain thus leading to miscalculations. Another important aspect was that when calculating future reductions of emissions an optimistic view of growth rates was used, leading to over-allocation.
One major set back for the EU ETS came when the new member states were to be introduced into the trading scheme. There was a dispute of how historical emissions and emission baselines should be calculated for these, primarily eastern European nations. Many eastern European nations rely on fossil fuels for energy production and hence their relatively high historical emissions lead to very demanding emission reductions. The European Commission disregarded these nations own calculations of historical emissions and enforced tighter caps.
When this paper was written, both Poland and Estonia had won the dispute and are now in reality allowed to set their own emissions targets. Naturally, they are expected to set more generous reduction targets on national firms thus generating more permits and effectively lowering the market price.
US Acid Rain Program
As the first large scale emissions trading scheme in the world, Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) primarily aimed towards reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) but also nitrogen dioxides (NO x ). Prior to Title IV (known as the US Acid Rain Program) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) aimed at reducing a number of air pollutants. The early programs aimed to reduce emissions were basically 'command-andcontrol' programs where firms received emission targets that they had to follow. In an attempt to lower reduction costs the EPA introduced tradable emission reduction credits. Firms could earn these by abating more than their set up targets and then trade them to other firms who had higher abatement costs or they could bank them for future periods (Tietenberg, 1998).
The US Acid Rain Program focused on emissions from electric utilities relying on fossil fuels.
The target for the emissions reduction was set to 8.95 million tonnes of SO 2 and 2 million tonnes of NO x compared to 1980 emissions, thus, a 50 % reduction of SO 2 emissions. The reduction target was to be reached with a cap-and-trade scheme consisting of two phases.
Phase I, beginning January 1 st 1995, included the so-called Table A units, or the largest polluters in the scheme. From January 1 st 2000 all other electric utilities using fossil fuels would be included. Additional reductions of the total amount of issued permits will be introduced every year, to be fully implemented by 2010 when the total emission reduction target of 8.95 million tons of SO 2 is to be fulfilled.
In 1979 the so called 'bubble-policy' was added to the Clean Air Act, this policy limited local emissions under the existing command-and-control scheme but at the same time let firms interact to achieve lowest possible cost of abatement. This also helped in limiting the creation of 'hot-spots' as levels of emissions could not increase above certain levels in one particular area while decreasing in another.
The initial allocation of permits to However, due to unforeseen changes in input prices (deregulation of rail road transport prior to 1995 introduced coal with lower amounts of sulfur that was too expensive compared to its high sulfur substitute before the deregulation (Ellerman et al. 1997) ) and earlier attempts to meet emissions targets the total emissions from table A listed units only summed to 5.30 tonnes in 1995. This gap between actual and allowed emissions led to permit prices being much lower than previously anticipated. Prior to the start of the program in 1995 expectations of the price of permits were as high as 1500 dollars according to Bohi and Burtraw (1997) .
Instead, auction prices in 1995 cleared at around 130 dollars (Bohi and Burtraw, 1997, Conrad and Kohn, 1996) Market volume was also a lot smaller than expected with only 9% of the affected units reporting that they relied on trading permits to fulfill their commitments regarding emissions (Rico, 1995).
Although not limited to small geographical areas, emitters of SO 2 and NO x contribute to acid rain on a regional, not global, level. Therefore there is some risk of local 'hot spots' to form when a national emissions trading scheme is implemented to control a regional problem of this sort. At an early stage of the US Acid Rain program two separate trading zones were considered, one for the western states and one for the eastern (Rico, 1995) . However, emissions were already somewhat regulated through local health standards, included in these standards were both levels of NO x and SO 2 (Rico, 1995) .
UK Emissions Trading Scheme
The UK emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) The CCX is open to participants all over the world, but a majority of participating members are based in the US. As opposed to the UK Emissions Trading Scheme where the government created an economical incentive to participate through pay-outs under compliance, the CCX has no such economical incentive. Instead the CCX offers a good marketing possibility and a head start to potential future obligatory emissions trading schemes.
There are 4 ways of participating in the CCX.
• Members are companies and organizations with large greenhouse gas emissions who commit to reduce their emissions within the two phase program.
• Associate members are companies and organizations with minor greenhouse gas emissions who commit to offset all of their indirect emissions from energy consumption and transportation.
• Participant members can be divided into sub groups. Offset providers and offset aggregators are allowed to create emissions reductions through, for example, reforestations projects and trade them on the market. Members are also allowed to create offsets. Therefore one criterion is that the offset providers and offset aggregators do not have large emissions of their own. Offset aggregators are umbrella organizations for small offset providers. Liquidity providers are participants who do not take part of any emissions reduction activities but solely want to trade on the market for other reasons.
• An Exchange participant is anyone who enters the market to purchase Carbon Financial Instruments to account for their emissions.
Permits to emit, called Carbon Financial Instruments (CFIs), can be acquired in two ways. At the beginning of each year members and associate members are given (free of charge) the number of CFIs corresponding to their baseline of emission minus the promised reduction for that year. Offsets providers and offset aggregators can also generate CFIs through verified emissions reduction activities (ICAO, 2007) . Worth to mention is that members are not allowed to offset more than 50% of their annual emissions reduction targets and hence the market is somehow protected against flooding of CFIs (Hamilton et al, 2008) .
Problems and solutions
As in the case with UK Emissions Trading Scheme the first years of the CCX were marked by The first period resulted in 11.5% lower emissions than aimed for, the corresponding number for the second period is 14%. The third and fourth periods had over-compliance of 12.2% and 9.2% respectively. In 2007 actual emissions were 4.2% lower than promised. As a result of this, the price for CFI's has been generally low in the CCX. Market clearing prices at the beginning of trading in 2003 were 98 cents for each tonne of CO 2 .
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a relatively new mandatory emissions trading scheme that caps CO 2 emissions from the power sector in ten US states. Each member state auctions their permits thus raising revenues that are used for renewable energy sources and consumer benefits in the local economy. Auctions for emission permits are held quarterly with the first one in September 2008. The first compliance period, consisting of three years, started on January 1 st 2009. Currently the scheme has a proposed lifetime of three compliance periods resulting in a total of 10 percent lower emissions in 2018. Since the RGGI is at the beginning of the first compliance period, and no data on abatement and the successfulness of the scheme has been released, it is hard to draw any conclusions from the scheme. So far, five auctions have been held and the market clearing prices have ranged between 2.19 and 3.51 US dollars per tonne CO 2 . Since the RGGI relies solely on auctioning to distribute their allowances it will be interesting to follow the results of the scheme in the future.
Lessons learned and concluding remarks
As a concluding remark, what has been seen in previous emissions trading schemes and how their weaknesses and problems can be avoided in the coming trading scheme for aviation under the EU ETS will be discussed.
Allocation
Over all, emission reductions have, sometimes greatly, succeeded the set out targets in all of the trading schemes subject to this analysis. It is interesting, and above all, important to know the reasons for this in order to design efficient trading schemes in the future. There are two possibilities to why actual emissions would exceed targets. Firstly, baselines and emission quotas can be calculated too generously. This could be done with or without the regulators knowledge. One could expect emission targets to be more generous in voluntary emission trading schemes to attract more participants for example. It is also possible that information on historical emissions is hard to obtain thus resulting in error margins, large or small. Some variables used to calculate targets, such as growth rate, can be optimistic estimates leading to higher than normal emission targets. When emission targets are too generous, some firms might be able to continue with business as usual while receiving permits that they can trade on the market. In this case permits become a pure wealth transfer and the market for emissions. Airports (or air traffic controllers) could be an alternative to air craft operators.
Given some certain assumptions 7 , the choice of liable agent should not affect the outcome of trade, the interesting criterions are instead to minimize transaction costs and to make the scope of the scheme as large as possible, i. e. to include as much emissions as possible (Bohm, 1999) . There are no clear advantages or disadvantages with either air craft operators or airports (air traffic controllers) that lead to the conclusion that one is strictly better than the 
Inter-temporal trade
The idea behind tradable emissions permits is that the market will allocate permits as to achieve the lowest cost of abating a certain given amount. The same statement also holds over time where an individual firm can allocate its present and future emission permits as to achieve the lowest possible cost of abatement. However, looking at previous systems for emissions trading, none has allowed borrowing from future permits while already issued permits have been allowed to be banked for future use in all of the schemes. Naturally, borrowing poses a problem of asymmetric information where the legislators do not know whether or not the firm will stay in the scheme for the following period. Thus, allowing firms to borrow from future allocations introduces a risk that these borrowed permits will not be accounted for in the future due to market exits for example. Banking posed a huge threat to the UK ETS where a large excess of permits would have been left in the bank after 2006 (i. e.
the last trading period of the DP's) potentially ruining the whole system. Fortunately, drastic measures saved the scheme from this. However, this problem cannot be blamed entirely on banking but rather on over-generous initial allocation leading to the creation of this huge excess supply. It is possible that, if borrowing is allowed, air craft operators will use a greater part of their permits today and strive for new fuel efficient technology to account for the lower supply of permits tomorrow. That is, allowing for full inter-temporal trade within the system might lead to more fuel efficient air crafts in the future.
8
Hot-spots
Since emissions of CO 2 do not have any impact on climate at a local level but rather on a global level there are usually no hot-spot problems regarding trade of CO 2 permits. But, whereas emissions of CO 2 can be accounted for on a one-to-one basis between emitting sectors the impact from other greenhouse gases from aviation on global warming is supposedly larger due to the high altitudes where most of the emissions occur. Evidence suggests that the impact on global warming from aviation is greater than from other sectors because emitting takes place at higher altitudes (IPCC, 1999; Lee and Sausen, 2000; Delft, 2005) . Allowing the aviation sector to use permits issued for other sectors might increase the negative impact on climate that the systems aims to avoid. Hence, there is a potential threat of "hot-spots" in some sense when implementing aviation into the EU ETS. There was a potential threat of local hot-spots forming under the Acid Rain program, at an early stage two separated trading zones were discussed as a measure to eliminate the threat but the Clean Air Act already included policies prohibiting local air qualities to be lower than a certain level. In a similar way, the problem under the trading scheme for aviation in the EU ETS could be avoided by not allowing the aviation sector to trade with other sectors or by establishing an exchange rate for permits, however, there is no empirical evidence to support any specific size of such an exchange rate.
Trade barrier
The European Commission has decided to introduce a gateway prohibiting a net flow of allowances going from the international aviation sector to the stationary sources. If one of the sectors has a high marginal cost of abatement without having the possibility to purchase additional emission permits from firms with lower cost of abatement the same emission reduction will apply, but it will be more costly as the firms with higher costs still have to abate instead of covering emissions with permits. One can of course argue that the international aviation sector probably will face higher costs of abatement, and by allowing them to purchase and use emissions from other sectors this problem will never emerge.
However, there are other explanations for a trade barrier in the EU ETS between aviation and the stationary sources. The EU ETS is the tool to achieve the European goals of emissions reduction under the Kyoto Protocol. Since emissions from the international aviation sector is not controlled under the Kyoto Protocol, allowing the sector to trade under the same regime would jeopardize achieving the goals that are set up under the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, the Commission has decided to impose this one-way trade barrier such that the aviation sector will be able to use permits from the other sectors but not vice versa. The barrier to trade might be a pure political instrument, with a growth rate exceeding increases in fuel efficiency aviation is expected to have a harder time complying with the goals of the emissions trading scheme, meaning that aviation as a sector probably will be a net purchaser of permits rendering a non-binding trade barrier.
None of the other emissions trading schemes analysed here has used any trading barriers between sub-groups, although it was discussed at an early stage of the Acid Rain Program.
Legislators estimated that without a trading barrier eastern utilities would sell a large portion of their permits to western utilities thus creating local hot-spots of emissions in the west. Title 1 under the Clean Air Act does however include restrictions on local air qualities so the proposition of two separated trading zones was abandoned (Rico, 1995 , Tietenberg, 1998 . In the UK ETS we saw two sub-groups that were allowed to engage in trade with each other.
The over generous allocation to the DP's posed a threat to ruin the market for permits under the trading scheme. One could argue that separated markets would have avoided this problem altogether but when looking at the reason for this large over-achieving actually creating the problem it can easily be seen that more strict allocations would have avoided the problem as well.
Concluding Remarks
The trading system for aviation is unique and different from all the previous systems that we have looked at. Nonetheless, lessons can be learned from previous systems and some conclusions can be drawn from their designs. First of all, as has been seen, initial allocations have played a key role in creating efficient markets for trading of permits. All of the previous schemes analyzed here have had problems where actual emissions have been lower than expected. Even though this is a desirable scenario it has resulted in different problems later on in the schemes, extremely low market prices for example. It is understandable that it is hard to achieve political acceptance for a trading scheme and at the same time impose tight emissions caps. This was shown in particular by the law suits from some member states of the EU against the Commission regarding too strict emissions targets where the Commission has lost some if its authority and thus damaging the credibility of the scheme.
Secondly, the controversial gateway of trading between aviation and the stationary sources should be carefully examined since there is reason to believe that greenhouse gases from aviation will lead to greater environmental impact than those from the stationary sources. It is, however, understandable that the Commission does not want to put emission targets under the Kyoto protocol in danger by introducing additional tradable permits on the market.
No emissions trading scheme will ever be free from problems at its initial stage but lessons can be learned from previous mistakes as well as successes in order to minimize the initial problems. It is also important to ensure that any potential problems that can arise within the trading schemes also are allowed to be solved within the boundaries of the scheme.
